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Alternative Dispute Resolution and Social Justice* 
Over the past several years we have seen tremendous growth 
in scholarly and practical efforts to advance the traditions of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Conflict Intervention. What 
are the actual and potential relationships between these 
developing traditions and another tradition, that of the struggle 
for social justice? In this chapter I attempt to promote 
dialogue on this question. 
As a way of signalling my ~rien~ation to this task, I want 
to indicate that the tradition of scholarship and social action I 
am rooted in focuses on social change and social justice. It 
generally is not a revolutionary or radical tradition, but a 
progressive and reformist tradition. It assumes the existence of 
socially organized patterns of injustice and domination; 
moreover, it emphasizes the necessity of major structural and 
cultural changes in institutions and communities, and the 
*This chapter is a revised version of a talk given at the 1989 
National Conference on Peace and Conflict Resolution, Montreal, 
Canada, March 4, 1989. I am grateful to James Crowfoot, Edith 
Lewis, Richard Salem, my PCMA colleagues, and several NCPCR 
discussants for their comments and reactions to preliminary 
versions of this work. I also want to express my intellectual 
debt to David Luban (1989);whose brilliant review of some of 
these issues I discovered after the Conference presentation and 
used in this elaboration. 
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development of multicultural personal and institutional behavior, 
as conditions for lasting peace and justice in America. 
My background and experience is not in the tradition of 
Alternative Dispute ~esolution or Conflict Intervention, per se, 
except as those strategies help promote institutional change and 
social justice. Thus, I am more committed to justice-making or 
social change-making than to dispute settlement or conflict 
resolution. My work is not neutralist or impartial; it more often. 
takes the form of identification or consultation and alignment 
with or assistance to a disadvantaged or oppressed party (first 
.party intervention) than third party intervention and mediation. 
What is social iustice? 
"Justice is not just one virtue among the lot. It is the 
cornerstone of human togetherness. To try to define it is to 
address the most profound questions ever to challenge the 
human mind. In the definition of social justice is contained 
one's definition of person and of society. Also at issue is 
the relationship of the individual to societyM (Maguire, 
1980, p. 57). 
What is meant by social justice? I do not have a detailed 
answer to that question: I am not sufficiently well-versed as a 
moral philosopher to have synthesized and reconciled the many 
competing arguments and positions that exist in the 
literature...and in our human experience. Moreover, I think it is 
more important to create and act upon context-specific 
definitions of social justice than to debate vaguely general and 
abstract notions. Abstract definitions become battle cries, and 
occasions for both the worst and best kinds of liberatory 
struggles, moral crusades, terrorism, joyous celebrations, 
violent repression and legitimized victimization. 
Despite these cautions, we do need to consider some minimal 
conditions or starting places for ,a common understanding of 
social justice, and thus for a.common inquiry into the issues of 
conflict and dispute resolution. The literature of social, 
political and moral philosophy'provides a host of alternative , 
conceptions and definitions. One important starting place is the 
distinction between procedural iustice and distributive iustice. 
Procedural justice refers to the fairness of procedures or 
mechanisms utilized to allocate societal resources, adjudicate 
disputes, or permit/promote various life opportunities and 
choices throughout the population. Examples of such mechanisms' 
include the legal system (e.g., equality before the law, right to 
counsel, etc.), the educational system, immigration and 
citizenship criteria and pathways, guidelines for economic and 
political participation, discourse rules, etc. Distributive 
justice refers to the fairness of the allocations of resources 
and opportunities themselves, in a sense the voutcomes~ of 
whatever procedures are used. Examples of such resource 
distribution patterns include differential levels of mortality 
and morbidity, income/wealth, education, health care, criminal 
victimization, punishment, access to clean airlwater, etc., 
throughout the population. 
Much current debate in our society centers on the relative 
preference for one or another of these principled forms of 
justice. For instance, many argue that procedural justice is key, 
, and that fair procedures means that justice exists even if 
outcomes are skewed. Others argue that skewed outcomes. are in and 
of themselves evidence of injustice at work, and.that apparently 
*#fairw or even similar procedures that result in "unfairw 
outcomes are not fair. This is roughly similar to the question of 
whether Ifequal treatmentf1 and Ifsame treatmentff are equivalent 
terms when dealing with people who are different, who have 
different talents and styles, and who have different access to 
societal resources. Is treating people differently, in accordance 
with their group's unique characteristics, or their 
individuality, more or less just than treating everyone the same, 
regardless of their uniqueness? We shall return to this question 
later, when we examine various principles or'criteria for 
justice, and different ways approaching or attaining it. 
Although these two forms of justice .are conceptually 
distinct, they may be quite interdependent in practice. For 
instance, Walzer (1986) argues that for distributive justice to 
work effectively, certain societal conditions must prevail: (1) a 
substantial public sector of shared economic, political and 
cultural infrastructures - thus enabling citizens to participate 
in valued social activities; (2) communal provision for those who 
cannot participate effectively - the ill, unemployed, uneducated, 
oppressed, etc.; (3) equality of opportunity to participate in 
economic, political and cultural activities, and; (4) a strong 
democracy in both public and private spheres of activity, with a 
wide distribution of political power - thus enabling citizens 
broad access to decision-making channels. These conditions are 
basically components of procedural justice, and Walzer is arguing . 
that just procedures are a necessary, although not sufficient, 
condition for assuring just outcomes. 
Underlying these distinctions, and overlaying all 
discussions of justice, are varying definitions or ideologies 
about what are "just  outcome^^^. Figure 1,summarizes several key 
principles or criteria for the just distribution of resources in 
the society or in any sub-societal social system. For instance, 
many theorists and philosophers argue that liberty is the prime 
component of justice, that the ability of people freely to make 
decisions about their activities and options' is the central 
element in their ability to control their fate and pursue 
satisfaction on their own terms. As Bovard argued in a recent !#My 
Turnw piece in NEWSWEEK (1991, p. 13), ##In exchanges between 
individuals - and in contract law - the test of fairness is the 
voluntary consent of each party to the bargain: the free will 
which constitutes fair ex~hange.~' Others argue that eauitv is the 
prime component of justice, and that differences in individual 
talent, effort or investment (of money, time, skill, etc.) should 
be rewarded by differences in outcomes or rewards. Thus, people 
who work hard, who have valued talents and use them well, who 
contribute more to the communal enterprise, should get greater 
rewards than those people who work less hard, have less talent, 
or have talents that are valued less - and that such inequality 
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is just. Still others argue a third position, that eaualitv is 
primary, and that a relatively equal distribution of societal 
resources recognizes the inherent value of every individual 
person, regardless of their particular talent, effort and 
contribution. Moreover, it is suggested, such a distribution 
criterion helps to overcome the cultural and structural 
inequalities that give unfair advantages (equity value) and 
liberties (opportunities to act on free will) to some and 
disadvantages to others. A fourth major principle is need, the 
basis of the Marxist dictum, l1to each according to his (her) 
need." Such a criterion recognizes that.equality itself fails to 
respond to the fact that people (and classes of people) are not 
equal with regard to their needs, and thus that certain 
inequalities may be legitimate if they are tied t'ightly to 
differential need (e.g., the young need more education than do 
the elderly, the ill need more access to health care than do the 
healthy). A fifth major position stresses a sense of community 
solidarity as the prime component of justice, and that 
communicating with, caring about, and solving problems with .. 
others is essential. Such a criterion goes beyond material 
questions of distribution and raises new questions about the 
measures or'goals of private and public life and effort. 
Each of these principles has its advocates aAd detractors, 
although few commentators are purists with regard to a single 
principle, and few are apt to argue for complete liberty or 
equality or need irrespective of counter-claims. As several 
critics argue, the priority or (relatively) exclusive emphasis on 
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liberty and equity often ignores the ways in which concentrations 
of wealth and power limit or eliminate the liberty and -choices of 
certain classes of people (notably the poor, people of color, 
women, the young, etc.)( ~hillips, 1986; Sturm, 1981). In so 
doing, it also limits their access to the resources that can 
generate equity. The major critique of equality-based principles 
is that they fail to deal with mlegitimatell differences in 
individual talent or merit or effort, and the functional utility 
of stratification systems for social ef.ficiency and advance , -  
(Phillips, 1986; Sturm, 1981). Thus, a major challenge to equity 
and to equality theorists is to distinguish between relevant 
differences (those that perhaps should be rewarded unequally) and 
irrelevant, arbitrary or imposed differences (those that should 
not be bases for differential rewards). The major critique of 
need-based theories is that is it very difficult to assess need 
accurately (as .opposed to'preference), and that' rewarding need 
irrespective.of effort, like promoting equality, fails to 
engender motivation for effort. Another critique of both 
equality and need-based principles is that their implementation 
generally requires a cumbersome publiclstate apparatus to control 
"free exchange1@ and to manage redistribution, and that such a 
centralized, bureaucratic apparatus seriously constrains local 
community democracy and individual liberty. Moreover, the very 
fact of compulsory redistribution. seems to some to seriously 
violate personal freedom of choice. The major critique of the 
solidarity principle centers on the potential for consensualist 
conditions to create group conformity, groupthink and false 
consensus, rather than searching dialogue and creative problem- 
solving. Moreover, it has proven difficult to specify how one can 
create an Itideal speech situationw or maintain the conditions 
under which free discourse and a sense of community can occur. 
The same concentrations of privilege which constrain universal 
liberty, which artificially manufacture equity, and which 
frustrate equality, render many of the same groups voiceless or 
exclude them from full participation in community discourse and 
decision-making. For instance, even with the United Statest 
guarantees of freedom of individual speech and association, 
powerful political and economic forces control the shape of and 
participation in public policy debates, let alone their outcomes. 
Some may argue that community and liberty are content-less 
statements of procedure, that they point to the ways in which 
claims for justice should be processed rather than to the bases 
for allocating social goods and resources. Thus, perhaps they 
should not be considered true criteria for distributive justice. 
As I suggested earlier, the distinctions between procedural and 
distributive justice are not always clear. These two components, 
like the other three, appear to be so crucial to contemporary 
debates that I have retained them in our discussions of 
distributive justice. 
In the U. S. society, deviations from cherished norms of 
liberty must be defended carefully and rigorously. Our cultural 
preoccupation with the liberal rhetoric and ideology of 
individual rights and responsibilities supports the priorities on 
individual liberty and equity. Moreover, the economic structure 
of advanced industrial society leads easily to a fragmented 
Gesellschaften emphasis on individual achievement. This same 
emphasis often overlooks the existence of collective 
advantage/disadvantage, let alone the possibility of collective 
rights. It also overlooks Gemeinschaften concerns about 
collective responsibility, mutual aid, caring and compassionate 
relationships (Gilligan, 1982; Kamenka, 1979; Walzer, 1986). In 
fact, concerns about equality often are relegated to matters of 
procedural justice rather than distributive justice; that' is, 
whether all classes have equal legal rights and equal opportunity 
or access to mechanisms of advance rather than do all classes and 
individuals have equal resources or outcomes. Moreover, concerns 
about standards of community and solidarity, articulated in some 
societies and historic periods as fraternity (sic), generally are 
not seen as relevant to discussions of justice. As Pateman (1980) 
suggests, it is rare that concerns about love and compassion, or 
questions of solidarity and social relationships, enter 
discussions of justice. 
But women and feminist scholars often do see these issues as 
primary, and there is evidence that gender may have an important 
impact on views of justice, especially these latter concerns. 
Cook & Hegtvedt (1983) summarize experimental research indicating 
that females prefer equality to equity as the criterion for 
allocating rewards to coalition members (with the reverse being 
true for men) . Extending this research-based finding, Gilligan 
(1982) suggests that women considering fairness are more likely 
to concentrate on responsibilities than on rights, on 
relationships than on abstract principles, and on care and 
' compassion than on equality. In this regard, they are more likely 
to adopt views consistent with Walzer and Habermas1 emphasis on 
community solidarity ... and in fact to go beyond them. Douvan 
(1988) suggests that it is womenls experience in care-taking and 
life-giving roles (Ruddick, 1980) that prepares them to 
contextualize issues and to focus on relationships before making 
judgements.* Indeed, consider the following words of Portia, 
directed at Shylock, in a Court of Justice (The Merchant of 
Venice, Act IV, Scene I). 
Though justice be thy plea consider this- 
That in.the course of justice none of us 
Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy; 
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render 
The deeds of mercy. I have spoke this much 
To mitigate the justice of thy plea. 
One may argue whether this is a truly feminist view (of mercy or 
solidarity over vengeance or equity as two competing priorities 
of justice), a woman1s plea on behalf of her lover, or a cynical 
attempt at the manipulation of an "outsider Jewtt by a daughter of 
the elite. Regardless, it does help remind us that preference for 
any of these justice principles are contextualized by gender, 
race, class, historic era, societal form, and momentary crises or 
situations, etc. 
*This does not appear to be a claim for feminist essentialism, at 
least not on biological criteria alone. Rather, Ruddick'appears 
to argue for the relevance of social roles for the formation and 
maintenance of varied justice ideologies. 
As the preferred definitions or primary principles of 
justice differ, so too do the means by which justice is to be 
attained. Adherents of justice as liberty often advocate for the 
freedom to make independent contractual arrangements, with few 
constraints on an open market place. Equity adherents, likewise, 
assume and advocate a free market for the generation and exchange 
of investments and resources. Adherents of equality as justice 
argue that free markets seldom exist, and that they already are 
constrained by the operations of concentrations of wealth and 
power. The skewed market place primarily (and they argue, 
unjustly) benefits those with accumulated wealth and power 
(equity), rendering meaningless concepts of equality of 
opportunity and unrealistic an enduring link between equality of 
opportunity and equality of outcomes. Thus, equality advocates 
propose other means, such as the operations of a public weal, to 
guarantee the fair (re)distribution of wealth and power. This 
only makes sense, of course, if the public weal itself is 
representative of and accountable to groups with varying access 
to key resources. The failure of the public weal, or the state, 
to be so constructed and operative is one.factor leading to its 
current Ifcrisis of legitimacyu (Habermas, 1975). Still others, 
especially those advocates of justice as community, emphasize the 
role of broadly based community discourse.- dialogue, problem- 
solving and decision-making - as mechanisms for deciding upon the 
allocation of societal goods and resources. Their goal is the 
organization of "society linked to decision-making processes on 
the basis of discussion free from domination (Habermas, 1971, p. 
55)." As Hollinger notes, Habermasf concept of dialogue "rests on 
the willingness and the ability of people in different 
traditions, or differing people within one tradition, to work 
toward mutual understanding ,and cooperation through continued 
dialogue. This gives rise to a communicative model of community 
(Hollinger, 1985, p. xiii)," and to a Gemeinschaften emphasis on 
community as a unit of problem concern and solution (Lang, 1979). 
Such processes avoid or overcome the problem of alienation and 
oppression by promoting moral .inclusi.on, which "refers to 
relationships in which the parties are approximately equal, the 
potentiality for reciprocity exists, and both (or more) parties 
are entitled to fair processes and some share of community 
resources (Opotow,. 1990, p. 2) . It Moral inclusion of all people 
and groups, in this view, is an essential component of a just 
society. 
The priority concern for community means that the individual 
rights of people like DeFunis and Weber and Bakke'have to be 
balanced (and discussed in a dialogic context) against the 
individual rights of'members of a previously oppressed or 
disadvantaged (minority) groups, or against the collective rights 
of groups long excluded from the "moral ~ommunity~~ and its 
privileged access to medical schools and industrial employment. 
This is a classic case of the problem of (re)distribution of key 
resources (higher education, jobs) that involves issues of 
individual-collective rights and the meaning of equal 
opportunity, liberty, equity, equality .and community. Rawls 
(1971) raises similar issues when he suggests that individualsf 
"natural talentsu are part of a social gene pool, and thus open 
to collective claims (an argument sure to entice 
sociobiologists). 
Habermas argues further that rooting oneself in the 
community means that one "cannot isolate formal rights from the 
concrete context of social interests and historical ideas (1973, 
p. 119)11 operative in the society or organizational system. 
Indeed, in the concrete context of the United States in the 
1990s, talking about or attaining justice requires dealing with 
issues of race, class, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
, etc. These macro-level realities of social structural injustice 
are the settings within which micro-level injustice and disputes 
occur. And few would argue that on any justice criterion - 
liberty, equity, equality, need, solidarity - there is now real 
justice by race and class and gender within our society. 
~lthough some of these principles, .and the mechanisms for 
approaching them, are contradictory or conflictual, none are 
absolute or unitary. Rawls (1971) clearly attempts to moderate 
his emphasis on liberty as a first principle with a significant 
concern for relative equality (or at least redistribution with 
the least advantaged in mind). And Deutsch argues that "Under 
some conditions distributing,rewards according to individual 
needs will be more just, and under other conditions allocating in 
terms of individual productivity will be more so (1975, p. 40).11 
Deutsch suggests further that if the priority goal is to maximize 
productive capacity, equity is likely to be the preferred 
allocation principle (and hence the principal definer of 
justice); if harmonious social relations is the goal, equality is 
likely to be the preferred principle; and if fostering peoplesr 
welfare is sought, need is likely to be the preferred principle. 
A review of these various definitions, principles and 
arguments suggests that social justice must include a goodly 
measure of personal liberty throughout all social sectors and 
classes, the probability that people are equitably rewarded for 
their contributions, at least relative eaualitv of critical and 
life-sustainins resources among various peoples and parties, and 
the sense that deviations from equality are minimal, openly 
discussed and decided upon, and appropriate tlesitimate). Social 
justice also must include relative eaualitv of access to the 
power to discuss and allocate resources among various classes and 
peoples and parties and to the mechanisms for resolvins disputes 
and makins decisions. And social justice must include mutual 
a~~reciation and respect for the cultural differences in styles 
and beliefs and traditions that characterize various peoples and 
parties, as well as a meaningful sense of communitv identity and 
solidarity among various peoples and parties who are 
interdependent with one another*. Within such a range of 
criteria we may be able to see the possibilities for the 
advancement of the basic well being of all social groups, and for 
the reduction of official as well as incidental violence. 
*These conditions~obviously include elements both of procedural 
and distributive justice. More elaborate recent efforts to offer 
definitions of social justice can be found in Deutsch, 1975; 
Eckhoff, 1974; Habermas, 1975; Heller, 1989; Kamenka & Tay, 1979; 
Luban, 1989; Lucash, 1986; ~hillips, 1986; Rawls, 1971; Walzer, 
1983. 
Finally, Heller argues that (1989, p. 273) I1a just procedure 
is the condition of the good life - of all possible lives - but 
it is not sufficient for the good life. Justice is the 
'skeleton....I1 Perhaps it is the minimum condition. In her view, 
righteousness, emotional depth and even love also are essential. 
This view closely mirrors the position of other feminist 
theorists noted above, but Heller does not include these 
considerations as part of a definition of justice:.they are, 
evidently, simply other. conditions of a good life - individually 
and collectively. Coulson (1988), too, argues that justice is not 
the only criterion for assessing the outcomes of dispute 
resolution or indeed the good life and the good society. His 
argument-is somewhat different however; he argues that abundance 
and satisfaction may be more important to people, and therefore 
make them forget justice. 
Certainly justice is not the only criterion for a good 
society, but certainly it is an important'one. Given how the 
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promises or even the realities' of satisfaction and abundance 
often are used to mystify or "cool outt1 oppressed groups1 demands 
for justice, satisfaction with agreements is not a satisfactory 
principle for social justice. It matters little whether these 
satisfactory agreements are made with or without third party 
interveners, in a court of law or in the shadow of the court; 
satisfaction may be an irrelevant, or worse, criterion. To the 
extent that weaker or dominated parties in a struggle or in a 
society may have internalized the oppression visited upon and 
taught to them, they may willingly make agreements not in their 
best interests (Fanon, 1966; 1967). They may adopt a form of 
false consciousness or self-destruction that furthers their 
victimization.* They also may not have the tangible power to 
push for a just agreement, and (perhaps willingly, perhaps 
unwillingly) settle for what they acknowledge as an unjust but 
llsatisf actoryV1 (best they could do) settlement. Thus, VIBATNAV1 
(Fisher and Ury, 1983), often touted as the criterion against 
which to assess participation in ADR/CI, certainly is no 
indicator or guarantor of justice. 
The relationship between ADRICI and social Justice. 
"Justice, it is rightly said, presupposes conflict: there is 
no problem of justice,, and no conception of it, where there 
are no conflicts (Kamenka, 1979, p. 17)11 
Several elements in the prior discussion help identify the 
problematic relationship between ADR/CI and'social justice. These 
problems often can be captured in the difference between short- 
*The question of false consciousness, and the determination of 
anyonets best interest, is very complex and cannot be undertaken 
in depth here. Suffice to say, I do not advocate imposing 
lVobjectivew determinations of a person/groupts interest on that 
- 
groupfs wsubjectivell sense of its own welfare. At the same time, 
1,know that expecially powerless people/groups often are 
persuaded by dominant elites and the ruling culture to 
misconstrue their own potentialities and welfare. Such cultural 
hegemony is a crucial element in keeping an otherwise conflictual 
society or organization relatively harmonious, and for preserving 
the advantages of power and privilege. Once again, then, the 
call for informed dialogue and a genuine community of discourse 
may be a vital path to resolution of this theoretical and 
practical dilemma. 
term objectives of agreement-making or survival with minor 
changes and long-term goals of structural change or substantial 
resource redistribution. They also are evident in Lubanls (1989) 
distinction between "within the system justicew and "revisionary 
justice.t1 And they are evident in distinctions between advances 
in procedural iustice and distributive iustice. My primary 
concern is with the latter meanings of justice, for if "fairer 
proceduresm and minor changes do not lead to Itfairer outcomes1t 
and structural reform we have not made much progress. 
When parties are. in protracted and heated conflict with one 
another it sometimes is helpful for external actors to assist in 
the examination, settlement or resolution of such conflicts. The 
question is whether and when such assistance .(often called 
intervention) is truly helpful to the parties (and to which 
party), and whether such assistance can be provided in ways that 
increase the possibilities for social justice. Perhaps most 
explicitly, to what extent do such interventions help create or 
move toward the mcommunity of discourset1 explicated by Habermas 
and others? Conversely, when do such interventions replicate 
dominant parties1 historic advantages (and thus challenging 
groupsf disadvantages or oppression), or help settle disputes 
without regard for the achievement of social justice? 
The central question for justice-minded proponents of ADR/CI 
(and one which I cannot answer but only raise .here - a complete 
answer awaits better empirical' investigation) is the degree to 
which ADR as a process approaches procedural justice.and leads to 
greater distributive justice. Claims that ADR/CI can improve the 
quality of resolutions of conflicts and improve the relationships 
among contesting parties, by creating situations wherein the 
voices of all the parties are heard, and have potent impact on 
social system decision-making and ongoing operations, are 
relevant to this question. It is dangerous to attempt to 
evaluate such claims or answer such questions in the abstract, 
since the local contexts and realities of specific situations 
ultimately determine the value of any intervention. But claims 
about the value of ADR/CI often are made in the abstract. Thus, 
like the prior exploration of social justice, we need to venture 
some general principles and praises/critiques of ADR/CI, while 
being careful about the limits of a generic perspective. 
Most protracted conflicts (disputes) have their roots in 
perceived injustice (Gurr, 1970; Gamson, 1975; Gamson, 1968). 
Thus, surfacing and escalating conflict often is part of a 
groupts conscious strategy designed to require other parties to 
pay attention to the issues, to get them to "come to the tablef1 
to begin discussion or bargaining, to pressure and threaten 
others in the effort to gain different allocations of resources, 
and to pursue their conceptions of social justice. As Himes 
argues (1980, p. 14-15), "Social conflict is purposeful behavior. 
The parties intend to gain scarce resources and to overcome 
obstructing resistance...This requires the use of social power, 
since the obstructing group will not voluntarily give up the 
values in contest.I1 Under such circumstances, where conflict (and 
perhaps even violence) is part of the mechanism for the struggle 
over group interests, Rubinstein asks (1988, p. 18), "What is the 
role of conflict resolution?" ~nd'he responds (p. 18), "If the 
effect of localized group violence in the context of the American 
political system is to fulfill the basic needs of previously 
excluded, .impoverished and powerless groups, there may be no 
further necessity (or legitimacy) for conflict resolution." And 
if this is the case with violent conflict, how much more cautious 
should we be about the reduction, management or elimination of 
non-violent but noisy and distressing conflict? 
The structure of economic and political power in this 
society, when coupled with official state support for sustained 
inequality, does systematic injustice and often violence to 
people who lack the resources to meek their needs for life and 
happiness - let alone liberty. Both the private and public 
sectors maintain and often advance injustice on several of the 
principled criteria discussed earlier. In the face of such 
official injustice, violence and exploitation, .conflict - and 
conflict in its escalated'forms (unpeace, disorder, unruliness, 
even terrorism) - may be the only viable tools disempowered and 
unfairly treated groups have at their disposal in their struggle 
to bring attention to their situation or to gain adequate 
resources and life opportunities (see, for example, Coser, 1956; 
Gamson 1968, and a long line of social and political theorists). 
People trying to defend themselves against such exploitation or 
inequality often look like the primary escalators of conflict, 
when in fact they principally may be reactors to the violence and 
conflict generated by people with superior power. 
Rational dialogue and debate, pleas and petitions, and 
attempts at collaborative problem-solving (guided or unguided) 
are all too easily ignored by those whose privileged background 
and status insulate them from having to understand otherst life 
experiences, and whose status and power protect them from having 
to listen to or collaborate with disadvantaged or oppressed 
groupsf claims for justice; These powerful groups, by virtue of 
their privileged access to the societyfs information tools and 
cultural forms (e.g., media, scientific establishments, 
publication channels, etc.), generally are able to use tactics of 
dialogue and debate, and negotiation and mediation, to their 
partisan advantage. They also use their culturally and 
economically superior access to societyts processes of 
information creation (sciences) and dissemination (media) to 
outlisten, outargue, outflank, outcompromise, outcollaborate, 
delegitimize or just overpower protesting groups. 
There undoubtedly is considerable value to facilitating the 
informal and potentially consensual resolution of conflicts and 
disputes that are painful to people. certainly reduction of the 
costs (personal, political and material) of protracted litigation 
is a worthwhile course. Even when issues of social justice are 
,at stake, and when disputes occur among parties of unequal 
resources, third party intervention may be appropriate and 
useful. This may be clearest in some marital or divorce 
situations, intra-neighborhood conflicts, intra-agency or multi- 
unit disputes within an agency or organization, etc. However, 
even some of these situations may be implicitly and indirectly 
may be part of a larger social struggle. Under such 
circumstances, if underlying issues of structural conflict, 
oppression and long-term institutional change are not dealt with, 
we run the danger of applying band-aids to festering sores. 
In like vein, Bercovitch (1984) makes a distinction between 
conflict management, conflict settlement and conflict resolution. 
He states (p. 11): "A conflict is settled when destructive 
behavior has been reduced and hostile attitudes have been 
lessened...A conflict is said to be resolved when the basic 
structure of the situation giving rise to destructive behavior 
and hostile attitudes has been reevaluated or reperceived by the 
parties ... Conflict management can be directed toward conflict 
settlement, or it can be directed toward achieving the more 
complex, enduring outcome of conflict resolution.IW These 
distinctions are useful, although they are by no means accepted 
as general language in the field. In these terms, resolution is 
more 1-ikely to involve concerns about long term social change and 
social justice, as they have been reflected heretofore in this 
chapter, while settlement is more likely to focus on the 
immediate issues in overt dispute. The utility of these 
distinctions,are marred, unfortunately, by Bercovitchls focus on 
"destructive behaviorw and "hostile attitudes." Not all conflicts 
involve such behaviors and attitudes; as Himes and others 
indicate, they may have great social and personal rationality and 
utility. ~ercovitchls characterizations lead too easily to 
labelling conflict as "badn, and drawing attention away from 
underlying interests and issues. 
If aggrieved parties gain from the opportunity to engage in 
prompt, low-cost, consensual settlements not involving the courts 
they may feel satisfied, even justly served. But this may 
reflect procedural justice gained, perhaps at the expense of 
distributive justice. It also may be a temporary gain. It is 
especially likely to occur among low-power and oppressed groups 
who have been taught to internalize their oppression and to 
expect for little gain or redress. Recent critical analyses of 
women's experience in divorce mediation cases, for instance, 
raise precisely the concern about women "settling for lessn 
because of self-blame or guilt. Students who do not "knoww the 
system may back off from fullsome arguments to remedy school 
inequity because they feel they are too young or ignorant to 
debate or problem-solve on an equal level with adult experts and 
professionals. Grassroots community groups also may settle for 
less because they do not anticipate that they can fully 
articulate their needs, or that their needs will ever be 
reasonably responded to, within the system. All these groups may 
be satisfied with agreements made, without the criteria for 
justice being attained or raised seriously. 
But in the market place of ADR/CI offerings, as Luban points 
out, 18commercial suppliers of ADR sources depend on satisfied 
consumers for their livelihood (1989, p. 404; see also Coulson, 
1988, discussed above)," and thus may accept or promote 
"satisfied agreementsw as the criterion for successful 
intervention.* Under these conditions, mediators and interveners 
also are beneficiaries and empowered parties in the intervention 
process; thus, their satisfaction may be quite high as well. 
While this priority on agreement-making is an understandable 
response to disagreements that are painful or that disrupt the 
social process, and a boon' to mediatorsf own concerns, for 
economic and career advantage, it is a very limited orientation 
to social justice. 
The role of third party conflict intervention is most 
problematic when there are substantial power differentials among 
parties, involving traditionally oppressed sroups, where 
(distributive) social iustice concerns are,at stake. Here is 
where the fundamental structural conflicts in our society float 
(or explode) to the surface. It is in these situations where 
long-term settlements are most difficult to create, most likely 
not to be implemented, and most often to maintain or even 
increase injustice. Here many third party ADR and CI efforts end 
up reducing,, avoiding and neutralizing social protestf and 
retaining dominant power and privilege in the hands of elites and 
powerful stakeholders or bureaucratic managers. These 
intervention- efforts do not appear generally to alter 
institutional structures or to redistribute power and resources. 
Even when apparent uvictoryu or I1fair resolutionlt occurs, the use 
of a third party process may weaken the struggle for justice by 
reducing both the momentum and power of the 
*Note that this comes quite close to the I1freely made contractsg1 
priority in the case for justice as liberty. 
organizing/challenging effort and the pain/threat that elites 
experience (Cunningham et al., 1990;  plain, 1984; ~ilcox, 1971). 
In a broader framework, Hofrichter (1982, and other 
contributors to the Abel, 1982a volume) argues that these 
mediations, dispute-settlements and other attempts at informal 
justice tend to depoliticize and trivalize real social conflict 
by rationalizing and controlling struggle, by failing to consider 
and include fundamental social injustices which are at the root 
of many individual and localized disputes, and by removing or 
diverting the expression of grievances from the political arena. 
Certainly one does not have to adopt the entire perspective on 
class conflict and struggle reflected in the work of the critical 
legal scholars to be concerned about the relationship between 
ADR/CI approaches and the maintenance or alteration of structural 
oppression. 
The reduction of social protest and the failure to alter 
institutional structures is seldom the manifest or stated value 
system of ADR/CI pr,actitioners. However, it is the logical (and 
indeed the empirical) outcome of much current practice. It is 
most likely to be the outcome when both mediators and parties to 
a dispute fail to surface and examine the implications of these 
practices. It is not simply in the process of agreement-making 
that such concerns must be addressed, but also in the process of 
implementation. For instance, in the absence of continued 
conflict (local group mobilization, public advocacy, pressure for 
bureaucratic change, and sustained monitoring), many Supreme 
Court and lower court decisions regarding school desegregation, 
and other matters related to institutional reform, were ignored, 
sabotaged and just not implemented by (ir)responsible local 
officials (Dolbeare & Hammond, 1971; Kluger, 1975; Nakamura & 
Smallwood, 1980; Rodgers & Bullock, 1972). Why should we expect 
non-Court backed settlements to fare any better? One argument is 
that a consensual and problem-solving process, rather than an 
adversarial process, might increase the likelihood that 
agreements made will be kept. Leaving aside for the moment the 
question oz whether equally just agreements would be made in 
informal settings, it seems clear that the same implementation 
guarantors (continued local mobilization, public advocacy, 
pressure for bureaucratic change, and sustained monitoring) are 
as relevant here as they are in the court scenarios. To fail to 
plan for such activities ignores-many of the historic lessons of 
social struggle and social change, and betrays an overtrusting 
attitude toward the problem-solving process, as well as toward 
powerful groups' behavior. 
The claim that professional interveners only seek to serve 
parties' '(apparent) interests, as these interests are presented 
and articulated by the parties, is often presented as the reason 
why broader perspectives on societal structure and conflicts 
often are not pursued vigorously. Thus, it is argued that if a 
group representing poor people focuses its concern on inadequate 
garbage collection, and does not link this dispute to broader 
issues of taxation, employment opportunities, police protection, 
insurance redlining, neighborhood deterioration, etc., 
interveners should not draw these issues to their attention. This 
reasoning is seen as a way of ensuring that the parties, and not 
the intervener, "own the conflict." Certainly such sensitivity to 
ownership issues centers the action on the subjective interests 
of the part'ies rather than on some set of objective interests 
determined by academic or external analysts or agitators. But 
leaving it here, without any effort to clarify or discuss the 
relationships among these issues and sets of interests, is not 
justifiable in these terms. There are many ways to protect local 
ownership and subjectivity while encouraging the exploration of 
alternatives. Moreover, this "hands offn approach typically is 
eschewed in practice as well as in theory, as most competent 
interveners argue that they do and should help partiesf clarify 
their "realu interests. For example, in their generally sage 
advice to both lay disputants and professional interveners, 
Fisher and Ury (1983) devote two chapters to the necessity of 
distinguishing between surface or apparent positions or demands 
and underlying interests or needs: "Don't bargain over 
 position^^^ and "Focus on interests, not positions.It 
Unfortunately, these underlying interests seldom are linked to 
social justice concerns and structural change in social 
institutions or community operations. . Certainly, social justice- 
oriented interveners or mediators should not arrogantly impose a 
larger agenda (based on their conception of objective group 
interests) on clientsf, petitioners' or allies' subjective 
definitions of'their own interests. But they can surface the 
options and related issues clearly and enthusiastically, letting 
parties make their choices. Those parties who simply wish their 
particular grievances heard and attended to, and who do not want 
to engage in discussion or struggle over the social justice, 
implications of a tenant dispute, a small claims court case, a 
lack of community services, a divorce settlement, a toxic waste 
dump, prison conditions, racial antagonism in a community, wage 
and salary negotiations, fishing or land use rights, etc., 
certainly will not have been duped or mis-served by such an 
analysis or invitation. 
Earlier I reported Coulsonts (1987) support for the stance 
that social justice is not and should not necessarily be a 
concern of interveners. He argues that (p. 24) "private mediators 
are not officers of the state, obliged to enforce the laws or 
impose natural justice upon their environment. Their role is to 
facilitate bargaining in a generally unregulated, free society." 
Thus, he concludes, mediators are not necessarily responsible for 
the results of such bargaining, let alone the justice quality of 
these results. One can question not only the principle involved 
here, but as well Coulsonts assumptions about an llunregulated, 
free societyw, the ways that officers of the state llimpose 
natural justicen, etc. Nevertheless, his stance is a powerful and 
guiding orientation for many third party interveners, especially 
mediators. 
Despite the weight of current practice; some third party 
interveners do try and deal openly with these issues. Some do 
define and use social justice criteria, for both outcomes and 
procedures, as part of their work. Some do address the.need to go 
beyond accommodation and agreement, beyond mutual persuasion and 
incremental change, and do attempt to lay the groundwork for 
major structural changes in organizations and communities. 
, Some third party interveners do raise and acknowledge the 
important roles of race and class and sender differences and 
o~~ression in their work and in parties' conceptions of the 
interests and options at stake in a dispute (see, for example, 
Chesler, 1991; Goldstein, 1986, Merry, 1987; Weingarten and 
Douvan, 1985). Kochman (1981) argues that because people of 
color, people with strong ethnic ties, and white-anglos have 
markedly different cultural backgrounds they bring to a dispute 
different values, styles of expression, conceptions of conflict 
and therefore different preferences for settlement tactics and 
processes. For instance, compromise, victory, bargaining, 
fighting and even reasonable discourse have different meanings in 
these different cultures. As Auerbach notes, disputing is part 
of human behavior and "How people dispute is, after all, a 
function of how (and whether) they relate .(1983, p. 7) .I1 
Different cultures certainly teach and support different ways of 
relating. In this context the relative absence of people of 
color in the ADR/CI community itself, and the lack of racial 
issues explicitly on the agenda of related publications, is very 
problematic. However inadequately, women, gender conflicts, and 
gender influences on intervention roles are much better 
represented and considered in this craft/profession. 
And finally, some third party interveners do strive to 
balance the Dower relationship among contesting parties, and have 
written explicitly about the tactics that might prepare for and 
redress imbalance (Cormick, 1977; ~avis and Salem, 1984; Laue and 
Cormick, 1978; Susskind, 1981). As Mayer notes (1987, p. 79): 
"Power inequities cause problems because they lead to rigidity on 
the part of.both the stronger and the weaker parties, because 
they lead to a breakdown in the collaborative process, or because 
they cause unprincipled (in our terms, unjust) agreements to be 
reached.I1 Mayer goes further, to identify some of the varied 
sources of power that may be relevant to a dispute: formal 
authority, expertise, associational or referent power, resource 
control, procedural power, sanction power, nuisance power, 
habitual power, moral power, and personal power. Not all these 
forms of power are or need to be equal simultaneously, of course, 
but the effort to pluralize our common-sense notions of power and 
influence may highlight potential power balances that are not 
obvious. 
Unfortunately, even the best rhetoric of power balancing 
often cannot. be translated into practice. Even when it is, such 
power balancing efforts are most often temporary and laboratory- 
like in nature. They are extremely hard to sustain after or 
outside mediation sessions, and almost impossible for mediators 
to build into the ongoing life of organizations and communities. 
Where there is sustained power balancing it generally is because 
the weaker party has managed to generate such power prior to the 
bargaining/mediat,ing session, and not primarily because of the 
mediator's actions at the table. 
The failure to strive explicitly for social justice, the 
failure to focus clearly on creating structural change in 
oppressive social institutions, the failure to equalize the 
balance of power among disputing parties, and the failure to 
articulate a vision of multicultural processes and structures 
constitute burdens of proof for the ADR/CI profession. Not 
solely this profession, because these issues are relevant for all 
who seek to intervene in, improve or change social institutions. 
After all, these failures are the failures of our entire society, 
and not just of change agents and dispute resolvers. But if 
ADR/CI work seeks to improve our common life it must overcome 
these problems above all. Is this too much to ask? Perhaps. 
But not if the value framework and rhetoric underlying much 
ADR/CI practice and its practitioners includes a concern for 
social justice. 
ADRICI and the courts. 
Part of what is at stake in discussions of conflict and 
disputes, and their settlement or resolution, is our view of the 
proper and actual operation of the rule of law in social life. If 
ADR/CI is an alternative to the courts, what is it an alternative 
to? 
Certainly the commitment to guarantee equality before the 
law, and to provide liberty and justice for all, are central 
aspects of our constitutional legal system. In practical terms, 
some philosophers and social scientists argue that the law and 
legal procedures create and maintain public order and fairly 
settle disputes. Others suggest that the law and legal 
institutions primarily protect the weak and resource-less against 
the potentially rapacious action of powerful elites. And still . 
others argue that legal institutions primarily are instruments of 
state and elite control of the populace, especially of the 
actually or potentially unruly populace. One's view of the 
relative accuracy or mix of these different perspectives on the 
operation of legal systems affects one's sense of formal justice 
and of trust in the law as an arbiter of justice. It necessarily 
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also affects one's view of systems of informal justice and their 
possibilities. 
The third view, championed by the tradition of critical 
legal studies, suggests that the legal (and other) mechanisms of 
the state represent primarily the interests of wealthy and 
powerful classes, and that the unruly populace typically 
represents the weak and disadvantaged classes; thus the law 
generally acts to further codify and justify or legitimate 
economic, political and cultural dominance and oppression. 
Naturally, this system of legality and legally enforced order or 
peace and nominal change impacts most negatively on the interests 
and persons of people with the least power and access to societal 
resources - people of color, women, poor people, members of 
ethnic minorities, people with different sexual orientations, 
people with different cultural traditions, etc. As Auerbach 
argues, "Expectations of equal justice were nurtured, but they 
could not be fulfilled in a society where economic and political 
resources were unequally distributed (1983, p. 115).11 Therefore, 
ItAmerican legal institutions confront a...task: to legitimate 
their rule to all despite their special service to the privileged 
few (p. 143)." Under pressure (of public protest, of elitesf 
desire to stabilize or compromise disorder', of the search for 
moral order and common values) minor adjustments often are made 
to re-equilibrate the system and dismantle the most egregious 
forms of inequality and injustice. 
If protection of the interests of elite groups in the 
society is one major path of the law, can "bargaining in the 
shadow of the laww be far behind? Do most ADR/CI efforts follow 
this same path? Several scholars argue that ADR/CI is attractive 
precisely because such informal procedures promise to yield 
Itbetter justiceN (Abel, 1982; Galanter, 1985) . Agreements freely 
made, quickly and inexpensively, with intervener facilitation but 
without the adversarial trappings of lawyers, judges and formal 
rules, tends to put decisions back in the community, neighborhood 
or among the parties themselves.' This is certainly more 
participatory and democratic, and as ~pitzer (1982; p. 187) 
argues, social justice requires just such nmechanisms for 
establishing or revising the strength, autonomy and self- 
sufficiency of local social units (i.e., communities, 
neighborhoods, farms, etc.) above the experiences of 
bureaucratically encrusted, impersonal, professional.ized and 
otherwise \removedf monoliths of control.lt 
However, with regard to precisely these issues some critics 
warn that the reverse may occur, especially when fundamental 
rights or class-based claims are in dispute (Edwards, 1986; 
Nader, 1984), or when the power for change relies expressly on 
challenging groupsf ability to generate.conflict and threat 
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(Wilcox, 1971). These and other commentators (see especially the 
selections in Abel, 1982a) express concern that elitesf and 
managers' superior access to skills and resources in ADR/CI 
processes and forums, and the (perhaps unconscious) biases of 
many relatively affluent mediators, lead them to extend the 
state's (and therefore elitesf) control over poor people and 
people of color, while denying them full legal rights. As Abel 
argues (1982, p. 297) , "Informalism grants additional offensive 
weapons to those already endowed with disproportionate legal 
resources while depriving the legally disadvantaged of the 
protection of formal defenses." The result is a double whammy, 
and a form of 2nd or 3rd class justice, since we doubt that the 
courts consistently provide oppressed groups with 1st class 
justice anyway. 
All of who are critical of extra-legal or informal justice 
options for resolving disputes must remember that the formal 
justice system also promotes "unequal application of the laws to 
the lower classes (Lazarson, 1982, p. 159) .I1 1n an idealized 
construction, both the formal justice system of the courts and 
the informal justice system of ADR would seek to create the 
conditions for social justice - dialogue and problem solving and 
a community of discourse - by promising fair processes, processes 
that overcome the constraints of differential power and 
resources. But in reality do they deliver on this promise? And do 
they create new conditions of more just organizational and 
community life, or simply temporary opportunities for 
conversation, exchange and dispute settlement? 
a 
Given the serious question of whether the courts can/do 
provide procedural. or distributive justice to traditionally 
oppressed groups, are ADR/CI operations likely to be any worse? 
'ADR/CI procedures and outcomes could be assessed against c0ur.t 
operations in an attempt to answer this question (Fiss, 1984; 
Luban, 1985). Although empirical evidence on this matter is hard 
to come by, ADR/CI efforts are not likely to be any worse than 
the courts in this regard. But are they much better? 
ADRICI and wneutralit~n. 
One of the cornerstones of current ADR/CI practice, and of 
third party intervention generally, is the notion of intervener 
neutrality. In the context of specific social structures and 
social conflicts llneutralityn may have many meanings. It may 
refer primarily to the absence of formal and official or 
financial conflicts of interest, such that the intervener is not 
a member of any party to a dispute. Or it may mean that the 
intervener is not only not a member of any official party to the 
dispute, but also not a member (or beneficiary) of the broader 
class of people from which any party is drawn. It also may refer 
to a lack of personal valuation or investment in the parties, the 
issues or the outcome. Or it may refer to a commitment to a 
process that does not create new advantages or disadvantages for 
any of the parties in the process of engagement or settlement. 
Few scholars or interveners suggest that they can or should 
approach complete neutrality or impartiality. We all carry the 
heritage and perspectives of our race and gender and class, 
backgrounds, as well as our personal values and interests. But 
most professional ADR/CI is wrapped in a cloak of neutrality, and 
this can be a dangerous garment. It may be hard to see outside 
this cloak once adorned. It may be hard to take it off once put 
on. In practice, ,Forester & Stitzel argue-(1979, p. 260), the 
promise or pretense of neutrality "hides hundreds of strategic 
judgements that must be made - each of which can practically 
affect the benefits achieved by any party ... And it actually 
obscures...the mediator's own active influence on the outcomes 
that may be achieved." Moreover, where social struggle and - 
justice are concerned, personal valuation and investment may be 
unavoidable - and necessary. Indeed, in these contexts an 
intervention process that deliberately creates different sets of 
advantages/disadvantages than exist in the .society or community 
often are required - if power balancing is to occur and justice 
sought. 
Most important, neutral third party intervention is not 
likely to be neutral in the context of a social system (or a 
given dispute) replete with major power differentials and 
substantial differences in access to resources. Any neutral 
tactic, when set within a societal, community or settlement 
framework of power differentiation and oppression, inevitably 
takes on partisan meaning. When these meanings are ignored 
(deliberately or out of naivete, as a matter of principle or of 
strategy) resolutions necessarily slide in the direction of 
benefit to the most powerful forces. Then according to Forester & 
Spitler (1989, p. 255), "the mediator's neutrality has the . 
somewhat perverse outcome of reproducing the very inequality that 
the disputants bring to the negotiating table.I1 Moreover, 
neutrality in the face of oppression typically amounts to moral 
anesthesia and political irresponsibility. Is that what 
interveners should bring to the table? 
If it is obvious that there are serious problems with the 
concept of intervener "neutralityw in the midst of resource and 
power differentials and oppression, what about the case of 
culture and cultural differences? Do male and female mediators 
or interveners operate differently? Since some research 
indicates they do (and perhaps should, Weingarten & Douvan, 
1985), what might neutral mediation mean in a 'setting where 
gender issues are a- crucial part of the dispute? Do black and 
latino and asian and white-angIo interveners operate with the 
same styles and values? If not (and Kochman, 1981; Merry, 1987; 
suggest they do not), what are the implications of neutrality 
practiced by a mediator of one race in a setting where issues of 
race and/or ethnicity are part of the dispute? Or is the white 
and male and relatively affluent model of mediator and intervener 
behavior (such as canonized in SPIDR) the only option? Is this 
style neutral with regard to race and gender and culture? 
Some scholars and practitioners argue that mediators or 
interveners in the ADR/CI tradition must at least present 
themselves as neutral in order to make themselves and the process 
they use appealing to powerholders. To openly deny the myth of 
neutrality, they suggest, is a strategic error (see discussions 
in Colosi, 1983; Luban, 1989; Susskind & Ozawa, 1983). If 
mediator bias is skewed in favor of traditionally oppressed 
groups, it is anticipated that powerful groups would object, and 
thereby scuttle or avoid ADR/CI efforts. No doubt this occurs'on 
occasion, and thus there may be some strategic advantage to the 
maintenance of a public appearance of neutrality. But note that 
this line of reasoning rests on at least two assumptions: (1) 
that some (many?) apparently neutral mediators feel that they are 
at heart sympathetic to oppressed groupsf situations, enough so 
that this debate occurs when they gather or write; and (2) that 
gaining the trusting and willing participation of elite groups is 
more problematic (and important?) than the trusting and willing 
participation of traditionally oppressed groups, reflecting the 
greater power of elites in this system and therefore the probable 
structural bias of mediation procedures/settings. 
It is important to consider the possibility that-there also 
may be some strategic advantage to greater honesty, at whatever 
potential cost. It is not obvious that an intervener who 
announced non-neutrality with regard to outcomes, but concern for 
a fair (not necessarily neutral) process, automatically would be 
unattractive to all disputants. After all, many perpetrators of 
injustice and administrators of unjust systems do not see 
themselves in this way, and maintain the view that they do pursue 
just processes and outcomes. Salem suggests, for instance, that 
police chiefs, sheriffs and mayors he brought to the' negotiating 
table did not perceive him and other CRS mediators as "neutral," 
but saw them as "fair and truthfultt - and,therefore useful 
(Salem, 1989). If this is so it is a window of opportunity worth 
exploring. 
Further, in their discussion of conflict mediation in 
Central America, Wehr & Lederach (1991) suggest that some current 
"Theorists generally do not see mediator neutrality and 
impartiality as requisites for successful international 
mediation. In fact, in some cases mediator connectedness and bias 
prove to facilitate settlement (p. 87)." They discuss mediators 
who have operated as "insider-partials11, It... whose reservoir of 
trust and mutually recognized stature among conflictants, and 
cross-cutting affiliations with both sides, are so substantial as 
to permit a mediating function (p. 92).It 
If the primary issue in this debate is not neutrality, per 
set but the public or strategic presentation of neutrality, we 
should be able to discuss this strategic choice openly - amongst 
ourselves and often with groups in conflict. To the contrary, 
however, neutrality often is discussed as an article of faith - a 
revered principle. Neutrality as. a principle must be questioned 
- both on grounds of morality and of feasibility. 
Are there some examples of these issues available? 
It is important to decide the extent to which the concerns 
raised throughout this chapter are realistic and concrete, and 
whether they can be illustrated with specific examples.* As a 
start, in the December, 1988, issue of the DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
FORUM (How Community Justice Centers are Formed, 1988) there is a 
*Other scholars have conducted much more searching logical and 
empirical investigations of these issues, and perhaps reading 
their works can extend the analysis begun here to many other 
arenas of disputing, conflict resolution and social change. 
series of interviews with 6 directors of Community Justice 
Centers. ~heir,comments tand, in some sense, as a statement of 
where that field is. Three issues of special interest are 
addressed in these interviews: the demographic characteristics of 
mediators and mediating 'constituencies, the criteria of success 
for these Centers, and the skills these directors look for in 
selectingltraining mediators. 
In discussing their operations, most Center directors 
acknowledged (and regretted) a demographic bias of primarily 
white and (upper) middle class and highly educated mediators. 
certainly these.members of the dominant culture can be trained or 
retrained to be sensitive to and aware of the realities of life 
affecting people of color and poor people. However, such 
(re)training is a very complex process, and it generally requires 
promoting an understanding of one's own racial and class 
realities and privileges, of the realities of othersf lives, and 
of the institutional as well as individual natures of racism, 
sexism and class discrimination. While some directors did 
discuss their efforts to screen and train mediators, training in 
multicultural sensitivity, or in the.dynamics of institutional 
oppression and change, seldom was noted explicitly. In addition, 
however hard we elect to work at training and retraining, the 
movement appears at the present time to be predominantly white 
and middle class. 
These demographic biases in the practice of ADRICI are 
neither accidental nor trivial; they are part of this craft's 
politics, construction and operation, and perhaps its appeal. 
They tell us something about the culture, and therefore the tools 
and techniques practitioners may use, and raise questions about 
the implications of these tools for the cultures and politics of 
disadvantaged and oppressed (non-white, non-male, non-middle or 
upper class, etc.) peoples and communities. Would interveners 
selected from the populations of people of color and poor people 
practice their craft or operate their Centers differently? 
When asked whether they felt their Centers had been 
successful, the directors8 answers reflected four primary 
criteria for defining or assessing success: the volume of use or 
caseload; their credibility or attractiveness to the courts; 
their ability to attract a secure funding base; and the ability 
of mediators to make agreements. No reference was made to the 
creation of institutional change in the community or in conflict 
settings as a criterion for success. No reference was made to 
increasing the possibility of (any of the forms of) social 
justice as a criterion; the concept of "fairnessN was noted by 
one Center director, but was not a primary criterion overall. As 
we have argued, making agreements is not a necessary component of 
social justice or structural change, and the other three criteria 
have much more to do with institutional maintenance and survival 
than with the quality of life or justice available to the people 
served - especially in the case of poor people or people of 
color. 
When asked to identify the skills or characteristics of 
mediators that they looked for, Center directors emphasized 
language skills - both oral and written, compassion, and an 
ability to listen. These are important skills, to be sure. 
However, only one director mentioned wcultural sensitivityn or an 
ability to work in multicultural settings; no mention was made of 
a sense of.justice as an important orientation or skill; no 
mention was made of a commitment to social and institutional 
change. Whether this absence reflects the priorities of the 
Center directors, or of the interviewer who posed the questions 
to them, or of the editor who selected portions of the interviews 
for publication makes little difference for our purposes. The 
results help inform us about the nature of the broader ADR/CI 
movement. 
Another set of examples of where we are and what we do comes 
from a series of panels, papers and conferences that discuss or 
illustrate programs of conflict intervention in the schools. 
This is another important and growing portion of the field, one 
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that is receiving a lot of attention and funding, and is indeed 
quite I1trendy.l1 The values and directions inherent in these 
programs also stand, to a certain extent, for the entire field. 
A great deal of attention is being paid to training elementary 
and secondary school students in techniques of conflict 
intervention. Almost universally, they are being prepared (and 
limited) to intervene in disputes occurring among students. This 
is an important and useful set of objectives' and activities. 
Children undoubtedly learn valuable and useful skills and 
attitudes, the school environment can become less hostile or 
tense, and perhaps the materials and activities also enlighten 
teachers and administrators. 
However, some important issues and targets seemed to be 
systematically ignored. For instance, relatively little 
attention and discussion has focused on programs to train 
educators in these same skills of conflict intervention (see 
~cimecca, 1988, for a more elaborate commentary on this gap). 
Little attention and discussion has focused on altering the 
curriculum and pedagogy of the classroom and school. And little 
attention or discussion has focused on altering the 
organizational structures of schools themselves. Current school- 
based mediation and mediation-training efforts focus overmuch on 
Ifstudent problems" - such as truancy, fighting, failure - to the 
neglect of "system problemsn - such as irrelevant instruction, 
white dominance and monoculturalism, authoritarian adult 
control, and lack of ttpayoffw (in terms of jobs and future 
schooling, especially 'for youth of color and lower class youth) 
of school attendance. These systemic, structural problems create i 
the conditions for conflicts among students, or at least the 
fertile ground upon which these conflicts are escalated and 
played out. It is, after all, the social structure and (often 
covert) conflicts in our communities and school systems that 
create and pass on the pressures and problems that result in many 
of the conflicts experienced by and among students. Such 
structures eventually will overwhelm and overcome studentsf newly 
learned skills in conflict management/intervention, and quite 
possibly trivialize and brutalize them in the process. 
Why is so much of the focus of these programs on teaching 
the victims of oppression how to minimize their conflicts, or how 
to l1behavel1 better, without paying at least equal attention to 
the adult-dominated structure and culture that creates these 
conflicts in the peer system? Is this another example of a 
strategic choice ("we have to start here because it is the only 
way to get accessI1.) or of a principled preference? Would 
'designers or advocates of a different program be invited to leave 
the school - or not be invited in the first place? If this is 
just a strategic choice, are planners at least honest with each 
other about it? Are they sharing their strategy with their. 
student as well as adult clients? Are they at least educating 
young people regarding the power structure of the school and how 
they may defend themselves against it while they work to reduce 
peer conflict? 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s our staff at the 
~ducational Change Team was involved in a series of interventions 
in interracial and interstatus or intergenerational conflicts in 
urban secondary schools. In various situations we focused on 
training students, educators and community members in conflict 
intervention and organizational change skills; sometimes these 
groups were trained separately and sometimes together. Some of 
these efforts focused on organizing the constituencies at 
greatest risk in the school system (students of color and 
students of low economic status), some utilized tactics of 
organizational development, some fed back data gathered in the 
schools into the system, and some focused on disseminating 
specific skills in conflict mediation (Chesler et al., 1972; 
Chesler 61 Lohman, 1971; Wittes et al., 1972). While many 
interesting and successful interventions were made al'ong these 
lines, our staff encountered several critical problems in 
institutionalizing conflict intervention teams or processes in 
these high schools over time: (1) the unwillingness of high 
school administrators to permit student participation in the 
design and conduct of programs; (2) the desire of principals to 
control the flow of information and data on which program designs 
would or could be built; (3) a slackened desire to put 
professional time and energy into programs when schools no longer 
faced heated crises; (4) teacher resistance to students1 roles as 
conflict interveners around school organizational issues; (5) 
professionals1 resistance to looking beyond overt symptoms of 
racial tension to underlying problems in the structure of the 
school (Chesler, Bryant & Crowfoot, 1975). This experience, as 
well as the accumulated literature on the short lifespan of 
innovations that are not built into the ongoing structure of the 
organization, does not lead to optimism about student-focused 
Itadd-onsw seriously altering the conflict-creating structure of 
the school organization itself.  aili in^ such alteration, the 
system will remain the same, despite good efforts with individual 
+ groups of youngsters. Even worse, it may now employ 
representatives of these low power constituencies in the effort 
to control their peers, thus further mystifying the 
organization's true nature or structure. 
As important as it is to "gain and maintain entryn, to start 
somewhere, to deal with the pain that exists in our schools and 
communities, some of these particular beginnings may blind or 
distract us from important work aimed at reducing oppression, 
approaching multiculturalism, and -maximizing justice. An 
emphasis on making agreements and reducing overt behavioral 
conflict sooner or later leads to "false peace." Without 
simultaneous action on underlying structural conflicts it often 
leads to the preservation of injustice and the denial or delay of 
work to reduce oppression. Training the least powerful members 
of the organization, and focussing on making agreements, are 
useful but morally and politically inadequate as the primary 
agendas of this craft. Rather, making changes that move us . 
toward socially just systems of schooling (and living and 
working) must be primary, and ADR/CI should be undertaken in ways 
that fulfill that agenda more consistently and coherently. 
In raising these issues and posing these arguments I want to 
emphasize again that I am not operating from an anti-ADR or anti- 
CI stance. ADR/CI often plays a useful role in helping to reduce 
social conflict and to help low power groups be represented at 
the table of decision-making. ADR/CI can (and sometimes does) 
make meaningful contributions to some or all of the concerns and 
conditions for social justice. I want to encourage and ensure 
that it does so more often and more effectively. I cherish many 
of the inventive programs and interventions that are generated by 
this tradition and by some of its practitioners. Moreover, I 
often utilize and participate in them myself. Certainly I have 
indicated my belief that courts and non-mediated resolution 
processes are not necessarily any better. And certainly violence 
and brutality (official or unofficial), or the sheer exercise of 
coercive power, generally are worse. But I think we can do better 
ADR/CI work if we keep a clear focus on the language and goals of 
social change, social justice and non-oppressive or multicultural 
organizations and communities. As the following discussion 
suggests, however, it may only be possible to do this with the 
help of organized social movement organizations and pressure 
groups, groups that place new opportunities and demands upon 
interveners and upon all parties in a dispute. It often is these 
pressures that require communal discourse where none existed . 
previously, that give voice and representation to the voiceless 
and unrepresented, and that create the possibilities for 
llcommunities of disco~rse.~ 
What are some first ~artv options for interveners? 
There is a wide variety of roles interveners can play in 
conflict situations. Some alternatives to the traditional ADR 
emphasis on mediation have been detailed by Laue and his 
colleagues (Laue, 1986; Cormick & Laue, 1978). They examine the 
possibilities of the intervener as activist (member of a party to 
the.conflict who is an advocate of a specific position or 
outcome), advocate (an advocate for one of the parties), 
researcher (an advocate for the truth and factual matters), and 
enforcer (an advocate for peace and order). Fisher & Keashly 
(1988) add the role of the third party as consultant, also 
distinguishing between this role and traditional forms of 
mediation. They argue that the consultation process focuses more 
directly on facilitating creative problem-solving and altering 
the relationships among the parties, as contrasted with mediative 
efforts to forge agreements or compromises on specific goals and 
positions. They identify four key functions associated with this 
"skilled and impartial intermediary" as consultant: (1) inducing 
and maintaining mutual positive motivation; (2) improving the 
openness and accuracy of communication; (3) diagnosing the . 
conflict; and (4) regulating the interaction. Clearly a number of 
mediators would disagree with this role distinction, arguing that 
they, too, focus on altering the often hostile and adversarial 
relationships among the parties (see, for example, Bercovitchfs 
distinction between resolution and settlement, and earlier 
discussions of activist styles and power balancing in mediation). 
Most of these discussions focus on procedural rather than 
distributive justice. 
Some of these commentaries even begin to explore 
alternatives to the notion of a "third partytf as the primary or 
sole form of legitimated intervention (especially Lauefs notion 
of advocate and activist). Indeed, there are alternatives wherein 
interveners become Itfirst partytt consultants or aides, allied 
with-or acting primarily on behalf of one of the parties or 
issues in conflict. Especially when issues of oppression and 
social justice are at stake, a first party advocacy mode may be 
most appropriate. 
Some of the following options open to ADR/CI practition'ers 
and interveners can only be practiced with a first party 
alliance; others can be incorporated within a third party stance. 
Some are clearly alternatives to traditional ADR/CI intervention 
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strategies, while others are quite complementary with these 
approaches. They all attempt to use or work with conflict, rather 
than to reduce or eliminate it. Moreover, they (almost) all 
assume that the intervener has as much to learn from the local 
parties to a conflict, and the process of struggle, as she has to 
offer to the parties. Such co-learning efforts, efforts to 
combine local knowledge and general knowledge, efforts to combine 
credentialed expertise and lived experience, promise greater 
democratization of the intervener's skill and knowledge base.-The 
long-range question, of course, is whether the use of such 
options, in combination or competition with others, can increase 
our potential'for achieving distributive justice.* 
One option is to gather (probably local) data, review any 
relevant research, retrieve partiest own wisdom, and create with 
them critical analyses of issues and interests at stake in a 
social struggle, change effort or dispute. These analyses can 
help parties generate more coherent and effective change 
strategies, and can provide them with broader institutional or 
societal perspectives on the issues they already experience or 
understand. Examples might include description and specification 
of the meaning and existence of institutional racism as 
contrasted with individual racism, of subtle structural sexism as 
contrasted with overt sexual harassment, of the role of an 
*The following listing owes much to discussions with Frank 
Blechman and William Potapchuk of the Conflict Clinic Inc., and 
with colleagues of the Program on Conflict Management 
~lternatives, especially James Crowfoot, Barbara Israel and Barry 
Checkoway. 
oppressive school authority structure and culture in creating 
conflict among students in educational settings, of the 
monocultural assumptions underlying many cross-cultural disputes, 
and of the short-term and long-term advantages and disadvantages 
of various procedures for pursuing informal justice. Given their 
privileged access to (some would say control of) knowledge 
generating systems, elite groups can rather easily avail 
themselves of such information - in the form of scientific 
research, managerial training seminars or expert consultants. 
What is involved here is ensuring that all parties, especially . 
low-power parties, have access to such information, and access in 
a language and style that is meaningful and useful to them. This 
requires challenging the free market's privileged allocation of 
knowledge resources, and the substitution of equality for liberty 
in access to them. The democratization of such information would 
do much to equalize resources in a dispute and throughout the 
entire society. Finally, since some mediators and activists 
suggest that they do not fully understand the theoretical base 
from which they operate, or why they use which tactics, 
especially when they claim to operate from an experiential and 
intuitive base, critical analysis can help them discover, 
conceptualize and articulate the assumptions underlying their own 
practice. 
A second option involves the development of site-s~ecific 
action-research or intelliuence satherinu activities that help 
oppressed people (or any people invested in institutional change) 
learn more about their local situations and options. One variant 
of this approach is to conduct a community or organizational 
diagnosis, a tactical investigation such as those pioneered by 
Barry Greever at the Midwest Academy (Greever, nd) and John 
Gaventa at the Highlander Center (Gaventa, 1989). Such 
information might also identify additional parties who could be 
allies or coalitional partners in the dispute or the pressures or 
incentives for change that might impact successfully on key 
powerholders or decision-makers. The net result might be to help 
advocates or organizers discover the kinds of protest or change 
tactics they might employ. And still another variant could take 
the form of generating data and tactics relevant to gaining an 
advantageous posture in a negotiation or mediation session. All 
these efforts need to be guided by the experience and wisdom of 
the local oppressed population, lest these groups once again be 
excluded from processes of information generation and control as 
well as of social action. 
A third option takes the form of direct or llshadowll 
consultation with leaders and members of social chanse-oriented 
oraanizations. Similar roles may be played with a preferred party 
(or parties) in a multi-party dispute. The objective here is to 
assist a given party to consider a range of change strategies or 
bargaining postures, and to assist them further in implementing 
such strategies in the conflict arena. One may do such work 
quite openly or in hidden form, with one actor or many. 
A fourth option involves providing a party or organization 
with trainins in developiris the skills required to work 
effectively for social chanse or to further their interests in a 
.conflict setting. Six sets of skills seem relevant to discuss in 
this regard: (1) skills in overcoming internalized oppression; 
(2) skills in planning change strategies; (3) skills in dealing 
with conflict itself; (4) skills in building and running 
organizations; (5) skills in working in multicultural settings; 
and (6) skills in designing/implementing long-term change in 
organizational structures. Efforts to help dominated groups 
overcome the internalized o~~ression they often experience 
typically involve the kind of "literacy trainingm discussed by 
Friere (1970; 1973). New information, new analytic perspectives, 
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new ideologies and a sense of hope or confidence all are part of 
such a resocialization process. Parallel to work on overcoming 
internalized oppression among dominated groups, it is necessary 
to help their potential allies in dominant groups overcome their 
sense of privilege and their (perhaps unconsciously) oppressive 
behavior. Out of this mix we may see the development of new and 
more potent coalitions (Chesler, 1981). Friere's (and others8) 
efforts to.help oppressed groups achieve literacy and 
findlexpress their voice is a direct link to Habermasr notion of 
the creation of a community of discourse as a justice principle. 
Skills in plannins chanse stratesies generally include 
learning how to analyze the change potential of situations, 
establish objectives and targets of change, understand one's own 
talents and abilities, understand one's own level of acceptable 
risk-taking behavior, develop feasible strategies, organize 
resources, monitor change, balance the opportunity/costs of 
incremental change and major restructuring, and escalate and 
deescalate conflict. skills in. workins in conflict settinqs are 
often quite similar, as they also involve learning how to 
escalate and deescalate the level of tension or conflict in a 
situation, listening, empathizing with others, dealing 
effectively with cultural differences, presenting one's interests 
and positions clearly, collaborating, creating coalitions, 
resisting bribes and blandishments, linking particular conflicts 
to underlying organization,al or community problems, demystifying 
the apparent connections between conflict and unjustice or - 
between agreements and justice, etc. 
Skills in building and runnins social chanse orsanizations 
involve learning how to recruit members and run meetings, how to 
exercise leadership and divide labor and responsibilities, how to 
operate a (relatively) democratic and efficient organization, how 
to reach out to others and create high internal morale, etc. 
Training efforts to aid people to work effectively in 
multicultural'settinss require learning about one's own ethnic 
history and relationships to others, understanding systems of 
racial, gender and cultural dominance and oppression in this 
society, living with differences in ways that cherish rather than 
avoid or deny their meaning and power, etc. 
And finally, skills in desisnins and implementins lons-term 
chanae in institutional structures involve learning how to think 
in organizational as contrasted with individual terms, 
understanding the linkages between particular disputes and the. 
structural .oppression that creates and escalates them, 
understanding the levers for organizational and community change, 
dealing with the interface between persons committed to change 
and well-established roles and relationships embedded in the 
organization or community, altering reward systems that denote 
the payoff for new organizational (and personal) behavior, 
assessing the potential for major restructuring versus 
incremental change, involving local oppressed groups (or a wide 
range of stakeholders) as well as elites in management of the 
change process, creating monitoring mechanisms, etc. 
A fifth option focuses on work with elites or bureaucratic 
powerholders that may educate them, "soften them UDII or otherwise 
prepare them to a~~reciate and acce~t some of the interests and 
positions Dosed by protestins or challensins sroups. This is a 
very delicate path, of course, because it is fraught with some of 
the same dangers of cooptation and blindness that may accompany 
the "cloak of neutralityw. Once one works closely with 
powerholders it may be difficult not to accept in part their 
worldview, and thus to (perhaps inadvertently) soften weaker 
partiesJ challenges rather than pave the way for their . 
acceptance. However dangerous, this is an option. The dangers 
are somewhat ameliorated if practitioners electing this mode 
establish lines of trust and accountability with the parties to 
whom they are loyal, thus providing a buffer or protection (or at 
least a warning) against inappropriate and counter productive . 
behavior. 
Direct orsanizina assistance is of course another option. 
It is one important way to create the balance of power that can 
help an ADR/CI effort work in more just ways. It also is an 
important way for an outside intervener to establish credibility 
and to Itpay one's duesw to desired allies. 
These tactics carry within them the potential for utilizing 
conflict to advance justice, necessarily through the creation of 
organizational and social change. They also carry within them 
the seeds of power balancing and multiculturalism. They are part 
of the set of intervention tactics that must accompany efforts at 
informal justice. As Handler (1986) has argued eloquently, 
neither the courts nor the informal justice system themselves- 
will necessarily accomplish improvements in the position of 
oppressed groups. What is needed is "an informal system set in 
the context of social movement activity and the changed position 
of the bureaucracy (1986, p. 251)." Unless there is sustained 
effort to mobilize and express the concerns and powers of 
oppressed and disadvantaged constituencies, and as well to alter 
the styles and structures of bureaucracies and elite managers, 
just settlements will not be made and, when made, will not be 
implemented. 
Although there is a good deal of anecdotal information, and 
some solid research, on several of these options, very few 
studies or reports have tied them to the use of ADR/CI programs. 
It would be useful to create a research base, probably a 
systematic series of extended interviews with key actors and case 
studies of actual incidents or campaigns, that examined the o 
interfaces and transitions between first party intervention roles 
and third party roles, between conflict-escalatory or advocacy 
strategies of low power (and elite) groups and their approaches 
to negotiation/mediation settings, and certainly between informal 
and formal systems of dispute settlement. Such work might 
clarify all these options as well as answer many outstanding 
questions. 
It is extremely unlikely that several or all of these kinds 
of collaboration or assistance can be provided by a lone 
intervener or consultant or change agent or ally (Bercovitch, 
1984). Thus, a skilled and effective intervener must, in effect, 
be a team or group of interveners, and they must have taken the 
time and energy to discover and create effective ways of working 
as a team. In some situations, in fact, the ability of a diverse 
team to work together may stand as a model for conflicting 
parties in their own efforts to establish collaboration or 
coalitional connections. 
A call to come home? 
Much of the work undertaken within the ADR/CI tradition has 
its roots in concerns for social justice, basic institutional 
change and multicultural values. In professionalizing this craft, 
however, anxieties about credentials, neutrality and legitimacy 
with elites often have obscured these commitments. Moreover, it 
has brought into the arena some people who lack this commitment, 
and who are interested primarily in agreement-making. 
This chapter has been addressed primarily to those who wish 
to carry through a commitment to social justice in ADR/CI work. 
For then, the cloaks of neutrality and elite legitimacy are only 
some of many fashion options, and one must consider carefully the 
appropriateness of various rainments in different situations. 
Despite the almost universal preference for mediator roles, there 
are disadvantages (and advantages) to third party work, just as 
there are unique advantages (and disadvantages) to work in a 
first party mode. The modes we utilize obviously are tied to the 
general goals we pursue, as well as the specific circumstances, 
resources and relationships in which we are engaged. 
I hope ADR/CI practitioners and interveners can come home to 
primary values and commitments to work for social justice through 
social change, however directly or indirectly. I hope they/we can 
come home to a more deliberate and thoughtful focus on the ways 
in which ADR/CI can help create structural and institutional 
change, explicitly or implicitly.. And I hope they/we can come 
home to a commitment to building less oppressive and more just 
and multicultural communities and organizations. 
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